Workflow risk check: Find the GitHub workflow patterns behind tj-actions and Ultralytics

Paste a public GitHub repository. We read its .github/workflows files and composite actions (action.yml) and flag pull_request_target jobs that run a pull request's code, outsider-controlled text and action inputs pasted into run: scripts, release jobs that restore the Actions cache, tokens with more rights than the job needs and actions not pinned to a commit, each with the fix to paste.

What it does

  • Finds pull_request_target and workflow_run jobs that check out the pull request's code (the "pwn request"), also when the ref is passed through a step output or env var
  • Finds PR titles, branch names, issue and comment text pasted into run: and github-script
  • Flags workflows with no permissions: block, and write-all tokens
  • Reads composite actions' action.yml too: flags ${{ inputs.* }} pasted into run: steps, with the env: fix
  • Flags release and publish jobs that restore the Actions cache, also through a shared setup action in this or another repository, and cache-mode: write on triggers outsiders can start (the Ultralytics and TanStack route)
  • Flags id-token: write on a job that also installs, builds or tests, where any of that code can mint the publish token
  • Lists actions on a tag or branch and hands them to the Action pin lookup
  • A fix for every finding, plus self-hosted runner and unsecure-commands warnings

What goes in, what comes out

What goes in
A public GitHub repository (owner/repo or its URL), or the link to one workflow or action.yml file.
What comes out
Each workflow file and composite action with its triggers and findings by severity, the job, step and line, and a fix to paste. Unpinned actions go to the Action pin lookup in one click.
Example
actions/checkout on 17 October 2026: 7 workflow files, nothing to fix now, 5 to tighten (missing permissions blocks and actions on version tags).
Limits
Public repositories on github.com, up to 25 workflow files and 15 action.yml files. JavaScript and Docker actions' code and reusable workflows aren't opened; composite actions in other repositories are opened only when a release or publish job calls them (up to 10 per check, one level deep). 20 checks a day per IP address without an account. No finding doesn't mean a workflow is safe.

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