Workflow risk check: Find the GitHub workflow patterns behind tj-actions and Ultralytics
Paste a public GitHub repository. We read its .github/workflows files and composite actions (action.yml) and flag pull_request_target jobs that run a pull request's code, outsider-controlled text and action inputs pasted into run: scripts, release jobs that restore the Actions cache, tokens with more rights than the job needs and actions not pinned to a commit, each with the fix to paste.
What it does
- Finds pull_request_target and workflow_run jobs that check out the pull request's code (the "pwn request"), also when the ref is passed through a step output or env var
- Finds PR titles, branch names, issue and comment text pasted into run: and github-script
- Flags workflows with no permissions: block, and write-all tokens
- Reads composite actions' action.yml too: flags ${{ inputs.* }} pasted into run: steps, with the env: fix
- Flags release and publish jobs that restore the Actions cache, also through a shared setup action in this or another repository, and cache-mode: write on triggers outsiders can start (the Ultralytics and TanStack route)
- Flags id-token: write on a job that also installs, builds or tests, where any of that code can mint the publish token
- Lists actions on a tag or branch and hands them to the Action pin lookup
- A fix for every finding, plus self-hosted runner and unsecure-commands warnings
What goes in, what comes out
- What goes in
- A public GitHub repository (owner/repo or its URL), or the link to one workflow or action.yml file.
- What comes out
- Each workflow file and composite action with its triggers and findings by severity, the job, step and line, and a fix to paste. Unpinned actions go to the Action pin lookup in one click.
- Example
- actions/checkout on 17 October 2026: 7 workflow files, nothing to fix now, 5 to tighten (missing permissions blocks and actions on version tags).
- Limits
- Public repositories on github.com, up to 25 workflow files and 15 action.yml files. JavaScript and Docker actions' code and reusable workflows aren't opened; composite actions in other repositories are opened only when a release or publish job calls them (up to 10 per check, one level deep). 20 checks a day per IP address without an account. No finding doesn't mean a workflow is safe.